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TRUSTS
COLEMAN KARPSH*
Statute of Frauds
In Gardner v. Nash,1 the question of the applicability of the Statute
of Frauds relating to the establishment of trusts of land2 was present-
ed in a set of facts involving an oral promise by one person to an-
other to buy in the latter's land for his benefit at a foreclosure sale.
The action was brought by the mortgagor to set aside a master's sale
and to compel a reconveyance by the defendant who had bought the
land at foreclosure, on the ground that fraudulent conduct on the
part of the defendant had chilled the bidding. The testimony offered
was conflicting, but both below and on appeal the finding of fact was
that the defendant had made a promise to the plaintiff to buy in the
mortgaged property and hold it for the plaintiff's benefit, and that
at the sale, in the presence of the defendant, the plaintiff had let it
be known that the defendant was buying on the plaintiff's behalf.3
As a result competition was discouraged and the property was sold
at much less than its value. The court held that the circulation by
the plaintiff of the statement in the presence of the defendant was the
same as if the defendant himself had made the statement.
On the question of the applicability of the Statute of Frauds, the
court, adverting to earlier cases, held that the representation at the
sale by the defendant that he was purchasing for the plaintiff was,
without regard to whether there was or was not a promise made to
the plaintiff, such a fraud resulting in the chilling of the bid as to
justify the setting aside of the sale and the decreeing of a reconvey-
ance. The court points out that if there had been no fraud in the
sale but merely a promise which had been repudiated the Statute
of Frauds would be a bar.4 Because of the fraud, however, relief
OProfessor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 225 S.C. 123, 82 S.E. 2d 123 (1954).
2. CODn OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 67-1.
3. In such a case it is quite clear that a constructive trust comes into exis-
tence. All the acts and promises which give rise to it may be shown under the
saving provisions of § 67-3 CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, which
excepts trusts implied by law from the Statute.
4. The problem of oral promises to buy land for another at a forced sale
of the latter's property requires a bit of elaboration. It is quite clear that
where there is an oral promise to one who is a stranger to the property to buy
it in for him, the promisee gets no relief, unless there is fraud in the making
of the promise or perhaps a confidential relationship. This of course applies
only to real property; an express trust as to personal property can be estab-
lished orally. Again, however, if the bidding is chilled, the sale is subject to
being set aside, but it is doubtful that the title acquired in the meantime is held
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is given even though it may have the same practical effect as enforc-
ing the contract.
Duties and Liabilities of Trustee
In Rodge's v. Herron5 the area of a trustee's liability was fully
explored in an unusual set of facts. The case has been made the
subject of a case note in the South Carolina Larw Quarterly6, and
reference to it may be had for a complete understanding of the facts
and issues involved. In brief, for the purposes of this survey, the
facts were that a corporate trustee continued to pay income to a bene-
ficiary (the wife of the deceased settlor) after her right to income
had terminated by her remarriage, the trust instrument directing pay-
ment of income to her for life or until she remarried. The marriage
was not a ceremonial one, and the trustee had no knowledge that the
marriage had taken place; but the trustee had received letters from
the remaindermen to the effect that their mother, the income bene-
ficiary, had married again. Apparently the trustee did not take these
on a constructive trust for the promisee. If the oral promise is made to the
debtor, it is quite clear too, as the court points out, that that fact alone is not
enough to warrant equitable intervention. Still, if the promisor does not cir-
culate any statement that he is bidding for the debtor, it is possible for the
bidding to be chilled if the debtor, relying on the promise, refrains from bid-
ding. See RSTA IMtNT, TRUSTS § 44, comment ee (Supp. 1948): "Where
the owner of an interest in land which is about to be sold to satisfy a claim
against him refrains from preventing the sale or otherwise protecting his in-
terest, because of an oral promise to another to buy in the interest and re-
convey it to him, and the agreement is unenforceable because of the Statute
of Frauds, and the other buys in the interest and refuses to perform his promise,
he holds it upon a constructive trust for the owner." Of course, if the promise
is made and there is neither reliance by the debtor upon it nor a circulated re-
presentation by the promisor that he is acting for the debtor, there is no room
for the establishment of a constructive trust.
Cases of the kind discussed should be differentiated from those in which the
promisor buys in the property of the debtor at a forced sale on an oral promise
to hold the property as security for the repayment of the money advanced as
a loan for the purchase price. In such a case title is taken by a person who
is lending money, and the transaction is as much a mortgage transaction as if
the conveyance had been made by the selling officer to the promisee and the
latter had conveyed to the lender. It is no more than a deed absolute intended
as a mortgage and the facts can be established orally without a showing of
fraud. See Young v. Krell, 147 S.C. 1, 144 S.E. 512 (1928). The facts must,
as in other deed-mortgage cases, be established by clear and convincing testi-
mony. See, also, RSTATmSzNT, TRUSTS § 448: "Where a transfer of proper-
ty is made to one person and the purchase price is advanced by him as a loan
to another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the latter, but the transferee
can hold the property as security for the loan." And comment c: "The rule
stated in this section is applicable where a person owns property which is
about to be sold for non-payment of taxes, or on a foreclosure of a mortgage,
or on execution of a judgment, and another person orally agrees to buy in
the property on the sale, advancing the purchase price by way of loan to the
owner of the property."
5. 226 S.C. 317, 85 S.E. 2d 104 (1955).
6. 7 S.C.L.Q. 675 (Summer 1955).
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complaints seriously and continued to make payments. The ultimate
decision was in favor of the remainder beneficiaries, the court pitch-
ing liability on the failure of the trustee to measure up to the standard
of care required of trustees by its neglect to make inquiry as. to the
state of affairs after virtually being put on notice, and in departing
from the terms of the trust. While the court surveys the problem
of possible absolute liability in making payment to a person not en-
titled, reviewing generally the authorities on the subject, it did not
find it necessary to dispose of the case on any such principle. The
negligence of the trustee in failing to exercise reasonable care and
in departing from the trust was sufficient for the purposes of the case.
If doubts had been raised in the trustee's mind, as they should have
been, as to the propriety of making further payments, the trustee
should have applied to a court for instructions. Liability, however,
was held not to attach as to income paid from the time the common-
law marriage had its inception, but from the time when the first letter
from one of the remaindermen warning the trustee was received.
As to whether the trustee might have been held to absolute liability
if there had been a ceremonial marriage of which it did not know,
the court did not find it necessary to make a determination.
Rescission of Trust Deed
In Koebig v. S. C. National Bank7, decided in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals and originating in the Eastern District of South
Carolina, the action by the plaintiff, a person then of unsound mind,
by her guardian ad litem, was to set aside a deed made by her and her
husband to a trustee to pay income to the settlors for their joint lives,
and to the survivor for life, and thereafter payment to be made from
the corpus to named individuals and the remainder to designated
charities. The allegation was that the deed had been procured by
undue influence of the husband (who had died a few days after the
deed was made) and that the wife at the time lacked sufficient mental
capacity. The issues were resolved below adversely to the allegations
of lack of capacity and the exercise of undue influence. The case
on appeal is taken up largely with review of procedural matters, but
the findings were affirmed. The applicable substantive law as to
mental capacity and undue influence was South Carolina law, and
this, the court held, was correctly relied upon by the trial judge.8
The factors that warrant rescission or cancellation of trust deeds,
7. 217 F. 2d 713 (1954).
8. Way v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 61 S.C. 501, 39 S.E. 742
(1901); citing DuBose v. Keel, 90 S.C. 196, 71 S.E. 371 (1911); Hamer v.
David, 138 S.C. 491, 136 S.E. 744 (1926).
[Vol. 8
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such as fraud, mistake, undue influence, lack of capacity, and so on,
are no different than in the case of deeds under which no trust is
created; the problem is not essentially one of trusts.9
Constructive Trust - Procedure
In Greenwood Lumber Company v. Cronmer10 , the pivotal question
was whether the trial judge was in error in refusing to frame issues
for a jury in an action which was entirely equitable. The complaint
was essentially one for the establishment of a constructive trust, ac-
companied by demand for an accounting, and in conjunction seeking
the appointment of a receiver and an injunction against the disposal
of property. The lower court's refusal to frame issues was held on
appeal to be proper, since, while such issues may be framed in purely
equitable actions, they are intended solely for the enlightenment of
the judge trying the issues. Pertinent here is the aspect that a suit
to impress a constructive trust is exclusively equitable. 1 '
Charitable Trusts-Adverse Possession
The case of Presbyterian Church of James Island v. Pendarvis'2
is one of extreme novelty not only in South Carolina but apparently
elsewhere. The question it poses is that of the applicability of laches,
adverse possession and the statute of limitations as between the trus-
tees of a charitable trust and the beneficiaries or objects of the trust.
The case is the subject of a case note elsewhere in this issue of the
Quarterly and extended discussion here would be out of place. Some
additional observations and some repetitive remarks are, however,
in order.
The case goes back in its facts to 1713, when a conveyance of 100
acres of land was made by Captain Jonathan Drake, in consideration
of 150 pounds paid by the members of the Presbyterian Church on
James Island. The conveyance was in trust for the benefit of every
Presbyterian minister chosen by the members of the Church as their
pastor and in perpetual succession, "to inhabit, possess and enjoy."
In 1785 the Church was incorporated. Omitting some of the facts,
it appears that so far as the tract's ever being actually used by a
minister of the Church that was never done. Up to 1871 the record
does not show what use was made of the property. In that year the
9. RESTATEMgNT, TRUSTS § 333: "A trust can be rescinded or reformed
upon the same grounds upon which a transfer of property not in trust can be
rescinded or reformed."
10. 225 S.C. 375, 82 S.E. 2d 527 (1954).
11. See Nelson v. Boston, 202 S.C. 517, 25 S.E. 2d 740 (1943).
12. 86 S.E. 2d 740 (S.C. 1955).
1955]
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property was leased out by lease of record, in later years other leases
were made, and throughout the rent received was applied to general
church purposes. In 1939 the Church sold one acre of the tract, and
in 1945 it decided to subdivide the remainder of the tract. Over a
period of time many lots were sold, the proceeds again being used
for general church purposes, including the building of a manse for
the pastor. This action was a friendly suit brought against a pros-
pective purchaser, who ostensibly declined to accept the title because
of the possible lack of claimed absolute ownership by the Church.
The substance of the holding by the court is that by reason of the
long continued assumption of absolute ownership by the Church, with-
out regard to whether on its incorporation it took as a stranger or as
a successor trustee13, its acts beginning in 1871 were equivalent to
a repudiation of the trust, and from that time forward its holding
was adverse. Concededly its use of the property was a diversion
from the purposes of the trust. All these facts, the court concluded,
gave rise to a presumption of the extinguishment of the trust and
that all necessary steps were taken to give valid title to the Church.
The heart of the court's decision is that
where a trustee has repudiated his obligations as trustee, which
need not be in specific words but may consist of conduct incon-
sistent with the existence of the trust, and holds adversely,
a beneficiary with knowledge of the repudiation (italics sup-
plied) can no longer rely upon the trustee's continued perfor-
mance of duty.
The question must be: Who is the beneficiary? In a charitable
trust the theoretical beneficiary -although there may be beneficiaries
having a special interest - is the community or the public, a rather
vague, amorphous, undefined body lacking the tangible character of
the State. And although the Attorney General represents the public
in the enforcement of charitable trustslsa, it can hardly be supposed
that he is constructively charged with knowledge of acts constituting
repudiation. Even though, despite the unlikely possibility, he per-
13. The incorporation by trustee of a charitable trust hardly, if ever, seems
to indicate that by creating a new body the trustees so incorporating intend to
treat the corporation as a stranger to the trust. There have been several South
Carolina cases in which the question of subsequent incorporation as affecting
the trust have arisen. Such incorporation has been held not to have adversely
affected the trust or to have terminated it. Wilson v. Presbyterian Church, 2
Richardson's Equity 192 (1846) ; Ex Parte Trustees of Greenville Academies,
7 Richardson's Equity 471 (1854); Bates v. Taylor, 28 S.C. 476, 6 S.E. 327
(1887).
13a. CoDE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 1-240. See, also, §§ 67-71
through 67-75, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
[Vol. 8
5
Karesh: Trusts
Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OV SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
sonally knew or was notified by others of the repudiation, he is not
himself such a representative of the public that his knowledge could
be said to affect prejudicially the interests of the public. The bene-
ficiaries having a special interest-the ministers - are to be gener-
ated in perpetuity, and the knowledge gone would not be knowledge
of time yet to come. Who can be said therefore to have received as
beneficiary the notice that gives currency to adverse possession or
the statute of limitations? Certainly there can be adverse possession
against the trustees by a third person, and such adverse holding
would run against the beneficiaries the trustees represent. This, how-
ever, is quite a different question from that of an adverse holding by
the trustees against the beneficiaries.
What has been said here is admittedly largely repetitive of the case
note which has been mentioned. Practically, what the court has
done is to cut the Gordian Knot, and to recognize that after all the
property belongs to the Church. Still there are elements of danger
in the reasons which the court advances. Since charities may exist
in perpetuity, the factor of time lapse should not be given much con-
sideration on the question of whether the coals should be raked over
in calling trustees of a charity to account. For the sake of repose
the courts should not be cluttered with stale demands, but where the
subject matter of the trust is known, at least so far as it is still in
the hands of the trustees, the trustees ought to be compelled to dis-
gorge. Let it be supposed that A and B are trustees of a perpetual
charitable trust for the relief of the poor. The subject matter is
rental real estate, the income of which is to be used for the intended
purpose. A and B in violation of the trust sell a portion of the real
estate to a third person, and they pocket the proceeds for their own
use. Everybody in the neighborhood knows of the wrong done by
A and B, who, to make matters worse, have let it be known to all
and sundry that they are going to sell off the rest of the land and
keep the money. Ten years elapse, the trustees retain the income,
and over the ten-year period they also occupy part of the property
themselves. Admittedly their conduct is hostile and notorious. Could
or should they successfully meet a challenge by the Attorney General
that they are the owners by adverse possession and that the statute
of limitations had begun to run in their favor ten years before? Or
if the subject matter is money and securities, will the unconcealed and
commonly known depredations of the trustees cut off the right to
call the trustees to account after six years from the time their mis-
conduct became a matter of public notoriety? The trouble is that
1955]
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with charities a member of the public as such has no standing to
complain, and everybody's business is nobody's business.
The truth of the whole matter seems to this writer to be that this
is one of those cases where the purposes of the original trust became
impractical or were originally so-unless there was the notion on
the part of the creators of the trust or some article of faith that a
tract of a hundred acres of land was just about large enough, or
necessary, to give room to the ministers to stroll in proper meditation.
Absent the cy pres doctrine in this State, should the trust be allowed
to fail, or should the matter be treated as one for the change of in-
vestment?14 If the diversion cannot be treated as a change of in-
vestment which a court would sanction, will a court permit the trustees
of a charitable trust to assert that since the trust cannot be carried
out (if it cannot) they are at liberty to keep the property for them-
selves if enough time has gone by?15
LEGISLATION
Investments
By act approved April 14, 1955,16 fiduciaries are permitted to invest
in obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by the Internation-
al Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "which is an interna-
tional institution, the members of which are governments of certain
nations of the world including the government of the United States,
and which was established and is operating under articles of agree-
ments signed by those governments."
By acts approved March 28, 1955,17 Section 1 of Act No. 744 of
the Acts of 1952, and Section 1 (a) of Act No. 745 of the Acts of
14. See Patton v. First Presbyterian Church, 129 S.C. 15, 123 S.E. 493
(1924).
15. There is the possibility that if the trust fails because of impossibility or
impracticability, the trustees then hold on a resulting trust for the settlor or his
heirs (as of what time? - See Elliott v. Morris, Harper's Equity 281 (1824) ,
Blount v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1888), and that there can be an
adverse holding against him or them-not as beneficiaries of the express
trust, because the beneficiary of that trust is the public, but as beneficiaries of
the resulting trust. Again, however, it would seem that to give currency to
the adverse holding, notice would have to be brought home to those benefi-
ciaries. Miller v. Saxton, 75 S.C. 237, 55 S.E. 310 (1906). See RESTATE-
mENT, TRusTs § 409.
The settlor is not necessarily the grantor. Where consideration for the
transfer is paid by a third person, he, and not the transferor, is the settlor.
RESTATMIENT, TRUSTS § 424; Peigler v. Jeffries, 128 S.C. 254, 264, 121 S.E.
783 (1923). In the present case, Captain Drake, the grantor, was not the
settlor; the persons paying the consideration were the settlors.
16. S. C. ACTs AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1955, No. 147, p. 195.
17. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1955, No. 110, p. 152; S. C. AcTs
AND JOINT RESOLUTIo NS 1955, No. 105, p. 147.
.[Vol. 8
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1952 (§ 67-58, 1954 Supp. South Carolina Code of Laws 1952)
were amended to include as legal investments debentures of the Re-
gional Banks for Cooperatives, organized under the Farm Credit
Act of 1933.
A major change in the investment statutes is the authorization by
Act approved May 11, 1955,18 of the establishment and operation of
common trust funds by trust institutions. The act is quite detailed
and, while not a Uniform Act, follows generally the Uniform Com-
mon Trust Fund Act and is closely patterned after similar acts in
many other states.
Another major change in the investment laws is the amendment of
the general investment statutelsa with respect to investment in cor-
porate securities. By Act approved March 28, 1955,19 debentures
are authorized as legal investments. In the prior general act there ap-
pears the clause authorizing investments in "preferred or common
stock of any corporation," followed by requirements in subsections
(3) and (4) that when the investment is in corporate stock "there
shall have been an unbroken record of dividend payments on such
stocks or shares during the period of ten years next preceding
the date of purchase," and that the total invested in stocks shall not
exceed thirty per cent of the corpus, nor shall investment in the
stock of any one corporation exceed ten per cent of the corpus. The
1955 amendment changes the first quoted language to read "de-
bentures preferred or common stock of any corporation ;" - the
punctuation, or lack of it, being exactly as quoted. No further or
other reference, is made to debentures, and, particularly, there is
no restriction placed upon them as a form of investment. With
the term "debentures" thus unqualified, undefined and unrestrict-
ed, a hazardous and risky form of investment is made permissible,
subject only to the rule of prudence. The term is a variable one and
seems to have received no precise definition. Generally speaking,
it is on more than an instrument representing a corporate obliga-
tion. "A writing or certificate issued as evidence of a debt; spec.,
any of various instruments (often called debenture bonds) issued
by corporations as evidences of debt, sometimes secured by a mort-
gage or other charge upon property, and sometimes no more than
an unsecured promissory note of the issuing corporation."
2 0
What the amendment therefore authorizes is the investment in
18. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1955, No. 267, p. 538.
18a. § 67-58, as amend. 1954 Supp. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
19. S. C. AcTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1955, No. 105, p. 147.
20. WaBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY.
19551
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any written obligation, secured or unsecured, of any corporation-
When it is considered that already under the act if the investment
is in any type of corporate obligation secured by first mortgage of
real estate, such obligation must have been outstanding for not less,
than five years and there must have been no default in the same period,
the inconsistency of permitting an investment in debentures without
security and without restriction is striking and cannot be justified,
or explained because the corporate writing is called a debenture in-
stead of a promissory note. It is true that in the general investment
statute and in other statutes dealing with investments by banks, in-
surance companies, and the like, investment in debentures is per-
mitted, but in each case the issuing corporation, a public or quasi-
public one, is named.21 In thus sanctioning specific debentures, the-
legislature has predetermined the character, worth and advantages-,
of these obligations. Whether the inclusion of debentures without
qualification was the result of accident or incomplete exploration, it
is manifestly out of line with the usual safeguarding requirements of'
investment statutes and practices. Because of the lack of definition
and in view of possible ambiguity, investing fiduciaries would be-
well advised to avoid in the meantime investment in debentures of
any corporation except those specifically authorized.
Banks as Trustees of Partnership Interests
By Act approved May 5, 1955,22 a new section to be known as
§ 8-245 is added to the Code:
Section 8-245. Any banking corporation or -trust company
authorized to act under this article as fiduciary which acts or is-
acting as trustee of a partnership interest for minor beneficiaries
shall not be liable as a partner except to the extent of the assets-
in the trust, the provisions of Sections 52-25, 52-27, 52-28, and"
52-29 to the contrary notwithstanding. Provided, however,
nothing in the Act shall waive, limit or restrict the duty and7
liability otherwise of the bank as trustee of a partners interest.
The sections cited in the foregoing amendment are provisions of
the Uniform Partnership Act creating and defining liability of part-
ners. It is clear that at least to the extent indicated corporate trus-
tees desire and receive protection. But it is not clear why the legis-
21. In the general investment statute, as amended, (Section 67-58) for ex-
ample, there is authorization of investment in debentures of the Federal In-
termediate Credit Bank, the Central Bank for Cooperatives, and Regional Banks.
for Cooperatives.
22. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RI soLuTIoNs 1955, No. 227, p. 321.
[Vol.&
9
Karesh: Trusts
Published by Scholar Commons,
1955] SURVeY oV SouTH CAROLINA LAW 149
lation is limited to corporate trustees, nor why it is limited to trusts
of infants' interests. Nothing in the nature of things prevents a
trust of a partnership interest- assuming such a trust is permis-
sible- for a person under some other type of disability, or for that
matter under no disability. And, while the amendment may create
immunity in terms of partnership liability, what of liability in terms
of the law of trusts ?
The amendment presupposes that a partnership interest - i. e., in
a going partnership - may be held in trust. Whether that supposi-
tion is correct from the point of view of local law remains to be seen.
Whether it is wise as a matter of policy, to the extent that it creates
a limited liability, is also to be questioned.
10
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